Issue 0110 21 APRIL 2010
Understanding Human Factors
"Human factors refer to environmental, organizational and job factors, and human and individual characteristics which influence behavior at work in a way which can affect health and safety."
WHY ARE HUMAN FACTORS IMPORTANT?
People will always be prone to making errors. We are flexible and adaptable but not particularly reliable in terms of our performance, especially under pressure or in complex situations. About 80% of accidents are attributed to 'human causes', and these are estimated to result in 30 million days lost at work each year. The percentage is different for different industries. What is clear is that the proportion attributed to human error has increased as the reliability (and probably sophistication) of the hardware has increased. Consideration of human factors is not just important from the point of view of accident prevention though. It is also necessary if occupational health is to be controlled, for example with respect to musculoskeletal disorders and stress.
TRADITIONAL VIEW
There is a tendency to blame the individual(s) involved when an accident occurs. It is easy to attribute the blame to them. "They made a mistake", or "they broke the rules."
But is it helpful to take this view? The premise is that seldom is it solely the individual's fault. In effect people are often set up to fail, though not often intentionally. By understanding more about the capabilities and limitations of people it is possible to see how the systems and organizations within which they work can contribute to their downfall . The main points in the traditional view are summarized as follows:
· Accidents are caused by individuals being negligent or not following rules/procedures
· Therefore blame the individual
· Prevention is then by use of disciplinary actions, more training, or more supervision for the individual.
This clearly has attractions for employers who can place the responsibility and onus for change onto the individual workers. They may see this as having the further advantage of minimizing their financial responsibility for making changes or improvements to the workplace or working conditions.
The problem with this old-fashioned approach is that it often addresses the symptoms rather than the underlying cause. But to err is human. Therefore it makes good sense to try to understand how to prevent more accidents.
STARTING TO MANAGE
HUMAN FACTORS
The management of human factors needs consideration of different aspects of the w
ork system. Think about the job, the organization, and the individual aspects and how they all contribute to the likelihood of human failure. Begin by addressing human factors in relevant activities such as:
· risk assessment
· incident investigation
· specification, design and procurement
· and in relevant areas of day-to-day operations such as shift work, health and safety culture etc.
Seeking the views of your workforce and safety representatives is an important part of the process if you are to identify issues and find workable solutions.
Remember that the behavior of people in your organization will be affected by its culture and expectations and the design of the work systems they are part of i.e. the equipment, environment, reward systems (e.g. pay), management approach etc.
Apply good human factors /ergonomics (i.e. knowledge about human capabilities and limitations etc) to all aspects of your work systems and you should minimize the likelihood of accidents and occupational ill-health and maximize the potential of your workforce. Applying human factors early on is more effective than trying to do so at the end, especially when designing new systems.
CONCLUSION
If we are to reduce the incidence of accidents, small-scale as well as large-scale, and control occupational health then it is clear we need to get away from the concept of taking a narrow view of incident causation i.e. we need to stop blaming the individual.
The study of human factors teaches us that incidents usually result from technical and organizational failures, as well as individual failures.
Only when we address these technical and organizational aspects will we be able to reduce the impact and likelihood of individual failures.
(excerpts taken from the article, Understanding Human Factors by Trevor F Shaw, Principal Scientific Officer, Health and Safety Executive, Health and Safety Congress 2002)
CONTROL MEASURES
The type of controls needed to prevent human failures depends on the type of human failure concerned.
For example, errors may be prevented by better design of the equipment, the job or procedures and by the provision of training. Violations, as intentional behaviors, require more consideration of the cause i.e. the motivation for the behavior. This may mean looking at the demands and characteristics of the job and the organization (e.g. culture) as well as the attitudes of the individual. The challenge is to develop work systems that are error tolerant. Since human error can never be completely prevented systems need to be able to cope with such errors.
This means building in a degree of tolerance such as providing the chance to undo a wrong action before it has ill-consequences. Human beings are also very good at recovering problem situations, given the scope to do so.
“Human error is inevitable. It can be reduced, but it can never be eliminated. Systems and procedures must therefore be designed to be error tolerant.”
- Dr Rob Lee, Aviation Safety Consultant, ATSB, Aviation Safety Spotlight 0308
James Reason is a professor of psychology at the University of Manchester. He hypothesizes that most accidents can be traced to one or more of four levels of failure: Organizational influences, unsafe supervision, preconditions for unsafe acts, and the unsafe acts themselves.
FROM THE SAFETY OFFICER’S DESK
CPT RAMIL E RANARIO PAF
Complacency is a strong word defined as “self-satisfaction accompanied by unawareness of actual danger or deficiencies”, which we regularly experience in our personal lives and at our jobs. When we feel confident the environment is stable, we often forget things are subject to change and become precarious in an instant. We become complacent about our personal safety by repeated exposure to situations without consequence. We take shortcuts and with the absence of consequents, cause us to become more lax about our personal safety, in other words we are becoming complacent. The places we feel the most familiar with can be the most perilous because the menace is not so obvious to us. In addition, complacency is an attitude that determines how we respond to given situations. Many of our jobs are repetitive in nature, and the more we repeat what we are doing, the better the chance that we are becoming complacent without even realizing it. Therein lies the potential danger, the danger of complacency. How many times have we heard the statement, "We have always done it that way." Of course, it must be right if it has stood the test of time and repetitiveness. Not necessarily true! The very fact it is repeated often can draw us into the complacency trap--we learn to expect proven results until one day, the outcome changes for the worse. Complacency is a known problem and must be clearly recognized as a causal factor in accidents. There is no cure for complacency, but we must be ever diligent in our prevention efforts. The key is being cognizant of its existence and the measures we can take to offset any negative consequences. Personal safety is not like a light switch that you can turn on or off, it must continuously be in the on position. Just because we feel safe, does not mean we are safe. On the contrary, “feeling safe all the time”, could be the biggest threat to our well being, because we are drifting into that complacent mode. One key to avoid the complacency trap is to form “safety habits”. Habits that you do over and over until they override your former unsafe behavior and become automated. Habits such as, wearing gloves, glasses, proper foot wear, safety harness on and ready to tie off, face shield when grinding, removing tripping hazards, attending safety meetings and paying attention, using seat belts, tying off a ladder etc etc. Is it not better to form these types of automatic habits, and let them become the norm? There is an old saying that familiarity breeds contempt. To paraphrase, I would say that, familiarity breeds complacency. Lets work in a manner that we ensure we do not fall into the complacency trap.
IN FOCUS: Features on Safety Personalities
“The ultimate safety responsibility for preserving human and material resources rests with the commander.” True advocates of safety takes into a large scale, the responsibility of managing the safety program and setting standards thereby creating norms and developing behavior leading to a safe culture within the unit. As such, a leader should spearhead his program in order for it to be a more effective tool in establishing a safety foundation.
BRIGADIER GENERAL ROY O DEVERATURDA AFP, Wing Commander, 15SW, is the man on top of things with regards to safety management of the 15SW safety program. Before being installed to the Wing’s top post, he held various safety positions, namely: Asst Flt Safety / Stan-Eval Offr, 240CTW, Wing Safety Offr, 15SW, Special Duty Safety Officer, 100TW, and as Director, Air Force Safety Office. GEN DEVERATURDA is a well-schooled in the field of safety having finished the System Safety at the Univ of Southern California, USA and his MA in Mgmt Studies at the Univ of South Wales, Australia. Likewise, he is a recipient of different medals and decorations to include the Kahusayan Award, the coveted Gen Pelagio Cruz Individual Flight Safety Award, and a recognition from the Air Safety Foundation for Outstanding Airmanship/Courage.
LESSONS LEARNED
CONTROLLING AGGRESSIVENESS
(excerpt from the article written by then 2LT LI-AN F DELA CRUZ for Bee Safe Magazine, 1999)
“As co-pilot of the MD520MG, I have the responsibility to assist my First Pilot, who is the Pilot-In-Command. I likewise act as his safety pilot. A such, I caution him with regard to obstacles during our flight—- whether we have deviated from our flight plan and things of this sort.
In one of our air strikes in Balo-I, Lanao del Sur, I had the opportunity of playing my role as my PIC’s safety pilot.
We took off the soccer field of the National Steel Corporation (NSC). Prior to the departure, we made our respective 360 visual inspection of our aircraft. We found everything okay and in place.
Then, we headed for the target. Over the target, however, the co-pilot’s door was opening. I closed it. Again, it opened and continued to do so for several times even as I was also closing it a number of times , too.
In fact, I told my PIC that I would just hold on to the doorknob to keep it from opening. He agreed. On the second thought, I told myself I couldn't continue doing it because I am also the one responsible to switch the armaments’ switches. And definitely, I could not do two things at the same time. Surely, too, my PIC could not activate the switches by himself because he had taken charge of the controls.
I suggested to my PIC instead that we go back to our landing station to have the door repaired by our crew. Since we were the wingman, he called on to the lead aircraft regarding our predicament.
Our element lead asked if locking it again would help it. My PIC said it could be done but that, it would open up again. Upon hearing this, our element lead decided to abort the airstrike, even if the ground troops had been frantic in requesting for air support.
Our element lead instead told the ground controller that we would fly back to the target once we have attended to the aircraft discrepancy.
After landing, my PIC lamented “saying ‘yung airstrike.” I could tell from his face his disappointment because it would have been another combat mission for him and our element lead.
But he also snapped at me and said :pero tama ‘yung ginawa mo.” he also added “dapat talaga i-call mo yung mga ganu’ng bagay sa PIC mo kasi trabaho mo yun. Huwag kang mahiya at matakot.”
Indeed, it was the most logical decision to do. We might have gone on an airstrike mission but that would have also most likely compromised safety. We did not only save ourselves but also prevented the possible loss of property.
SAFETY WATCHWORDS
“Safety requires that we educate our men; we give them the credibility to influence positively others through their knowledge and more importantly, we harness the safety attributes of the organization. We need to learn constantly, apply and imbibe safety practices from lessons learned in the past along with the knowledge gained from lecturers. And of course, share this knowledge with everybody; for organizational success, we will depend entirely on the consolidated effort of members for the attainment of a higher scheme or purpose.”
- LT GEN OSCAR H RABENA AFP
Commanding General, PAF
06 July 2009
“The safety organization functions are an extension of the commander. Safety is the responsibility of every leader, airman, family member, civilian employee, and including those directly transacting and doing business with the unit. The safety organization works with other Air Force and civilian elements in the implementation of the safety program in the workplace and in off duty activities and locations.”
- BRIG GEN ROY O DEVERATURDA AFP
Wing Commander, 15SW
04 September 2009
FOR MORE OF THE LATEST NEWS AND INFORMATION ON 15TH STRIKE WING,
PLEASE CONTACT THE WING PIO, CPT RENEE FAYE MONTENEGRO PAF @ LOCAL 8180 OR
EMAIL AT pio_15thsw@yahoo.com
